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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S. 
MABEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18338 
This is an action involving opposing claims by the Plaintiffs 
Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey and the Defendant Kay Peterson Construe-
tion Company, Inc. against each other. Plaintiffs Mabeys' claims 
were for damages resulting from breach of a written contract and breach 
of warranty in connection with the construction and sale of a home. 
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. also claimed damages 
for breach of contract and included an additional request for equitable 
relief in the form of contract reformation. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. At the conclusions of trial, the 
court found that the written contract between the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
was formed under a mutual mistake of fact. Having so found, the court, 
rather than reforming the contract to conform to the parties intention and 
understanding, simply entered judgment in favor of both the Plaintiffs 
Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey and the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction 
Company, Inc. The court also entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs 
on their claims for breach of warranty. From the court's judgment this 
appeal has been taken by the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, 
Inc. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of that portion of the judgment entered 
in favor of the Plaintiffs Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey, together with 
modification of that portion of the judgment entered in favor of the 
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. to conform said portion 
of the judgment to the undisputed evidence adduced at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The central issue in this case concerns the preparation and execution 
of a written contract (Pl.Ex.C) between the Plaintiffs Thomas C. and 
Louise S. Mabey (Respondents herein) and the Defendant Kay Peterson Con-
struction Company, Inc. (Appellant herein) for the purchase of a home 
constructed by the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc. For 
-2-
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convenience the parties will be hereafter referred to as "Mabeys" (or 
individually as "Tom Mabey", "Louise Mabey") and "Kay Peterson Construc-
tion" or "the Construction Company." The court properly and correctly 
found at the close of the trial proceedings that there had been a 
mutual mistake of fact in the formation and preparation of the written 
contract (T-132). However, rather than reform the contract so as to 
reflect the parties' actual intentions, the court chose instead to 
award damages to the Mabeys apparently for alleged breach of the con-
tract by Kay Peterson Construction and to award damages to Kay Peterson 
Construction allegedly resulting from the mutual mistake. 
About three or four months prior to November, 1979 the Mabeys 
and Mr. Kay Peterson on behalf of Kay Peterson Construction discussed 
the possibility of building a home on Lot 1 Indian Springs Estates, 
the property which is the subject of this litigation (T-40). The 
Mabeys understood that Kay Peterson Construction would build a house 
on that lot and if the house met with their approval they would purchase 
it (T-43,44). 
Sometime thereafter in the fall of 1979, Kay Peterson Construc-
tion began construction of a home on Lot 1 (T-40) . The construction 
loan for the home was obtained by Kay Peterson Construction from 
Mountain West Savings and Loan. The lot itself was owned at the time 
by a corporation named Mountain West Development. There was also an 
underlying mortgage on the lot in favor of Zion's Mortgage Corporation. 
-3-
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When the construction loan commitment was secured a check in the amount of 
$18,500 was drawn from the construction loan fund to obtain a release from 
Zion's Mortgage on behalf of Mountain West Development. Title to the lot 
was then put up as security on the construction loan (T-86,87,117,122). 
Mountain West Development eventually received $27,000 for the lot, the 
money being disbursed through Mountain West Savings & Loan and distributed 
partly to Mountain West Development with the remainder to Zion's Mortgage 
as described above (T-86,87). 
The plans to be followed in the construction of the home were submit-
ted to Kay Peterson Construction by Tom Mabey. Mr. Mabey had acquired 
the plans out of a plan book and had made substantial modifications and 
changes therein before he submitted them to the Construction Company (T-
35, 41). During the course of construction of the home, the Mabeys added 
their input. The Mabeys sub-contracted and paid separately for the 
plumbing (T-25,46); they installed the insulation themselves, took care 
of clean up and paid separately for the security system and some railing 
which were included in the home (T-25); they were consulted by Kay Peterson 
Construction concerning the orientation of siding on the exterior surf ace 
of the home (T-47), the location of a basement window (T-48), the addition 
of a fireplace (T-49) , the framing of the bathtub and the facing installed 
around it (T-50,51). The Mabeys selected the color of paint, the location 
and design of cabinets and light fixtures and the carpeting for the home 
(T-37) . They also obtained a commitment from Mountain West Savings and 
-4-
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Loan for a loan to purchase the home (T-14,Pl.Ex.A). Notwithstanding 
this not inconsiderable involvement in the construction phase of the 
home, it was the Mabey's understanding that they were neither committed 
nor obligated in any way to purchase the home once it was built (T-53). 
Around the middle of March, 1980, construction was nearing com-
pletion. In order to facilitate the financing of the home through 
Mountain West Savings and Loan, Torn Mabey prepared in his own hand a 
written contract on a standard Earnest Money Receipt form (Pl.Ex.C, 
T-58). For convenience this contract will be referred to hereinafter 
as "the Earnest Money Contract." In connection with the preparation 
of the Earnest Money Contract, Torn Mabey asked Mr. Kay Peterson, the 
president of Kay Peterson Construction, for an estimate of the cost 
of the completed project (T-58). In turn, Mr. Peterson asked the 
company bookkeeper, Mrs. Squires, to prepare the estimate from the 
Construction Company's records (T-97,115). Mrs. Squires prepared 
the estimate from the construction draw records of Kay Peterson Con-
struction and as to unfinished items, from the supplier's bids or 
the original cost estimates (T-97, 103) . Mrs.· Squires' estimate sheet 
became the document referred to on the face of the Earnest Money 
Contract as the "Projected Cost Estimate", Exhibit A. This document 
was incorporated into and became the third page attached to the 
Earnest Money Contract (Pl.Ex.C,T-95,96). 
The "Projected Cost Estimate" showed $77,565.00 as the amount of 
-5-
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the "Loan Disbursed to Date," unpaid bills of $12,734.96 and estimated 
completion costs on the remaining items of $43,768.44 to arrive at an 
overall cost estimate for the construction of $134,068.40. This figure 
included an item on line 37 designated "Lot Payoff - $9,000.00." Mrs. 
Squires, a reliable and experienced employee, gave the estimate to Mr. 
Peterson who, in turn, delivered ot ti Mr. Mabey (T-58,115). Upon re-
ceipt of the estimate, Mr. Mabey prepared the first page of the Earnest 
Money Contract (on the standard Earnest Money Receipt form), and set the 
total cost figure at $136,000 to accord Mr. Peterson approximately a 
$2,000 "buffer" against cost-overruns on the estimated figures (T-27,58,63). 
The Earnest Money Contract provided in part that it covered only the 
home and the improvements which had been constructed, and not the lot 
itself (Pl.Ex.C,T-119). The lot was acquired by the Mabeys through a 
purchase and trade with a third party. In other words, the lot was pur-
chased by a Mr. Jerry James, who then traded the lot to the Mabeys in 
exchange for interests of the Mabeys in other property (Pl.Ex.BiT-18,19,116). 
This exchange took place because the Mabeys believed they would not be 
able to afford to buy the home if the cost of the lot ($27,000) (T-61, 
86,87) were included in the purchase price and had to be financed also 
(T-18,19,39). 
During his review of the cost estimate sheet prepared by Mrs. Squires 
and in his discussions with Mr. Peterson, Tom Mabey was concerned that 
the lot price of $27,000.00 might be incorrectly included in the total cost 
-6-
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shown on the sheet (T-60). He placed a question mark adjacent to line 
37 which read "lot payoff: $9,000," wrote in the margin directly above 
that "was remaining $18,000 ... " and drew an arrow to the figure on 
line 1 of the sheet which read "Loan Disbursed to Date: 3/5/80" (T-60, 
61). He asked Mr. Peterson whether the $18,000 balance (i.e., the 
difference between the "lot pay off" figure of $9,000 and the $27,000 
lot price) was included in the "Loan Dispursed to Date 3/5/80" figure 
of $77,565 (T-60). Both Mr. Mabey and Mr. Peterson were aware that 
the underlying mortgage on the lot in favor of Zion's Mortgage had 
been satisfied by an advance in the approximate sum of $18,000 from 
the construction loan proceeds (T-60,61). Although Mr. Peterson had 
not supervised the preparation of the ·cost estimate or discussed it 
with his bookkeeper, he honestly believed the advance to be covered 
in that figure and told Mr. Mabey that it was so included (T-61). On 
this basis, and since the Earnest Money Contract was to cover the home 
only, the parties agreed to reduce the price shown on the Earnest Money 
Contract by $27,000, the full price of the lot, rather than only by 
$9,000, the lot payoff figure shown on line 37 of the cost estimate 
(T-61,62). The concluding paragraph of the Earnest Money Contract 
was then altered by Tom Mabey to read as follows: 
The purchase price is based on all costs relative to the 
construction of the dwelling as per plans and specifications 
plus an $8,500.00 Seller's profit. However, the total 
cost shall be based on the projected cost estimate, Exhibit 
A, attached and hereby made a part of this agreement, and 
in no event shall said total cost exceed ~i3e7999 $109,000.00 
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unless agreed upon in writing by both Buyer and Seller. 
The reduction of the price term was initialled by the parties and re-
flected the deletion of the price of the lot, which both parties believed 
to be included in the cost estimate attached to the Earnest Money Contract 
as Exhibit A (T-62,116). 
In fact, Mrs. Squires omitted to include the additional $18,000 for the 
lot in computing the figures shown on the "Projected Cost Estimate" (T-118) . 
Mr. Peterson believed this figure was included, as did Mr. Mabey, at the 
time the contract was executed. It was precisely because of this mutual 
understanding that the Earnest Money Contract price was reduced by $27,000 
instead of $9,000 (T-62,118). When Mr. Peterson discovered the mistake, 
he immediately contacted Tom Mabey and brought it to his attention. How-
ever, the latter refused to rescind or correct the contract and arranged 
to close the loan transaction with his bank based .on the figures shown on 
the Earnest Money Contract (T-27,28,118). 
When the funds acquired from the bank based on the mistaken contract 
purchase price had been distributed, Kay Peterson Construction was unable 
to pay all of the suppliers and sub-contractors on the home. These material-
rnen and sub-contractors then filed liens against the Mabey's home and 
initiated actions for payment (T-28;R-46 through R-140). When the Mabeys 
learned of the outstanding and unpaid liens, they brought the action in 
the lower court captioned Thomas C. Mabey and Louise s. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Construction Company, Inc., Civil No. 1-28199 to recover against 
-8-
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Kay Peterson Construction. The lien claims on the home were consolidated 
in the action styled Wasatch Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Kay Peterson, et al., 
Civil No. 2-28838. The Mabeys then arranged to compromise and satisfy 
the outstanding liens and borrowed funds from Zion,. s Bank to make pay-
ment thereon (T-28,29;Pl.Ex.G). By the time of trial all liens had 
been settled and the only claims outstanding in the Wasatch action were 
cross-claims between the Mabeys and Kay Peterson Construction which 
were identical to the complaint and counterclaims contained in the 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction action. Therefore, the two cases 
were consolidated for trial (R-26,175). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court ruled that the Earnest 
Money Contract had been formed under a mutual mistake of fact. The 
court then awarded judgment to Kay Peterson Construction based on the 
amount originally demanded in the counterclaim fil~d on behalf of Kay 
Peterson Construction. The court also awarded judgment to the Mabeys 
for the amount expended by them to satisfy the unpaid lien claims, 
together with damages for the.interest they paid on the loan and 
attorney's fees (T-132,133). 
The court also awarded damages in the sum of $5,400.00 to the 
Mabeys for the alleged failure of Kay Peterson Construction to com-
plete construction on certain items in the home in a quality workman-
like manner (T-132) . While no detailed list of defects was contained 
in the complaint, the complaint did allege generally defects in workman-
ship and request an award of damages in the sum of $5,440.00 (R-2). 
-9-
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At trial Mabeys introduced two written exhibits in support of the 
claim for defects. The first was a letter dated October 8, 1980 from 
Tom Mabey to his attorney, Mr. Diumenti, listing seventeen (17) claimed 
defects in construction (Pl.Ex.H). The second was dated November 4, 1981 
and styled "Correction Report." This document contained a list of 
only ten (10) claimed defects in construction (Pl.Ex.I). Tom Mabey testi-
fied that there were now no items other than those shown on the "Correc-
tion Report" (PloEx.I) which he alleged were deficient (T-31,32). Mr. 
Diumenti also represented to the court that his client was only claiming 
the right to recover on the ten (10) alleged defects in the inspection 
report, not_ the seventeen (17) listed in the earlier letter (T-67). The 
court accepted the exhibits for informational purposes only and not as 
proof of the truth of what was recited therein (T-73) . 
In chambers and before trial, counsel for Mabeys had represented 
to the court that the Utah State Department of Contractors had found 
at a hearing conducted just several days before trial on November 25, 
1981 some workmanship in the home to be defective and that the Depart-
ment had issued an order to that effect which required the defects to be 
corrected. The court apparently believed this to constitute a prior 
adjudication of these claims, notwithstanding the fact that counsel for 
Kay Peterson Construction advised the court that neither he nor his 
client were aware of any such order by the Department of Contractors. 
During the trial, the court alluded to this earlier meeting in chambers 
and proceeded to sustain evidentiary objections and limit the scope of 
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examination related to the alleged defects (T-31,66). 
The only evidence submitted at trial concerning the damages re-
sulting from the alleged ten (10) defects was the testimony of Tom 
Mabey who stated that he estimated the total cost to repair the 
alleged defects, based upon the cost of materials and an hourly 
charge of $17.00 per hour, would be $5,400.00 (T-34,35). No addi-
tional details as to the breakdown or manner of calculation were 
provided. 
Following the trial counsel for Kay Peterson Construction sub-
mitted objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law prepared by Mr. Diurnenti. Attached thereto was an affidavit 
from Steven Schwendimen of the Attorney General's office which set 
forth that the "Inspection Report" (Pl.Ex.I) was nothing more than 
a form of complaint to which Kay Peterson Construction was required 
to respond. No determination relative to the validity or accuracy 
of the alleged defects contained therein had been made (R-204) . 
Following a hearing on the objections, the court signed the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment as proposed 
without further comment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
HAVING CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT IN THE FORMATION 
AND EXECUTION OF THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS: 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT REFORMING 
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THE CONTRACT TO CONFORM TO THE INTENTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE PARTIES. 
It has long been the law in Utah that upon finding that a written 
instrument, due to a mutual mistake of fact, does not reflect the actual 
intention or understanding of the parties, the court will reform the 
instrument and enter judgment according to the terms of the instrument 
as reformed. The rule of law was applied by this court in Intermountain 
Farmer's Association v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973) to 
reform a deed from the plaintiff to the defendants and decrease the amount 
of property conveyed from five acres to two acres upon a showing that 
the plaintiff intended to convey only two acres and the defendants ex-
pected to receive no more. 
The rule was also found applicable in Jensen v. Manilla Corporation 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah, 
1977) to increase the amount of property sold under a real estate contract 
when it was established at trial that the purchaser, Jensen, thought he 
was buying and the real estate agent for the seller, the Church, thought 
he was selling all of a certain parcel of property located between two 
existing fence lines, even though the contract for sale failed to include 
in its description the south 32 feet of the property and this same 32 foot 
parcel had been subsequently conveyed by the Church to a third party. In 
affirming the reformation of the contract by the trial court, this court 
cited with approval from Powell on Real Property: 
-12-
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The power to obtain reformation of a written instrument 
exists when it can be satisfactorily proved (1) that the 
instrument as made failed to conform to what both parties 
intended; . . . 
6 Powell on Real Property §903 at 268.8-.10(1977) 
Id at 64 
This court also noted that parol evidence is specifically ad-
missible to show that a writing does not conform to the intent of 
the parties, Id at 64; cf: Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 
571 (1951), Janke v. Beckstead, 8 Utah 2d 247, 332 P.2d 933 (1958). 
The rule of reformation has been extended by this court to re-
form not only specific terms of written instruments as demonstrated above, 
but also the entire character of a written document or series of 
documents. In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah, 1975) the 
plaintiff, Kesler, was the purchaser on contract of a 480 acre tract 
of land and a nearby 318 acre tract, the contract for sale of which 
smaller tract included cattle and other personal property. Convey-
ances from the sellers for all of the real and personal property were 
held in escrow, pending performance by Kesler. Kesler was then 
approached by one Kershaw, who wished to acquire only the 480 acre 
parcel and after some negotiation Kesler and Kershaw entered into 
an agreement to sell the 480 acre tract. Since the documents evidencing 
title to the property were held in an escrow under Kesler's contract 
of purchase, the parties agreed that Kesler would assure marketable 
title in the 480 acre parcel by giving Kershaw a security interest 
in all the escrow property, which security interest would terminate 
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as to the 318 acre parcel and personal property upon transfer of title 
to the 480 acre parcel. By mistake the documents used to facilitate the 
transaction recited simply that all the property was conveyed to Kershaw. 
When Kershaw subsequently sold all of his holdings to the defendant Rogers, 
the documents evidencing the sales transaction between Kershaw and Rogers 
were not prepared to reflect the understanding between Kesler and Kershaw 
concerning the security interest arrangement; instead the documents per-
petuated the erroneously prepared language from the earlier transactiono 
Shortly after the sale was completed, Rogers, with the aid of several 
other people, siezed a number of cows from Kesler, claiming ownership under 
the written agreements with Kershaw. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment, which reformed the documents 
of conveyance into documents reflecting the intended security agreement 
and awarded Kesler damages against Rogers for the wrongful taking of his 
cattle, this court recited the basic rule for reformation of instruments: 
[A]s between the immediate parties, where the terms 
of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not 
show what the true intent and agreement between the parties 
was, it may be reformed to show that intento 
Id at 358 
The clear and undisputed facts adduced at the trial of this action 
establish, and the trial judge properly ruled, that the price term in 
the written contract between the Plaintiffs Mabey and the Defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction (the Earnest Money Contract - Pl.Ex.C) was erroneous-
ly formulated under a mutual mistake of fact. The parties intended that 
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the Earnest Money Contract should reflect the purchase price of the 
home only, and not the lot on which it was constructed. Both parties 
honestly, but mistakenly, believed that the cost breakdown sheet 
attached to the Earnest Money Contract as Exhibit A included the 
entire $27,000 cost of the lot, $9,000 shown as a "lot payoff" figure 
on line 37, the remaining $18,000 included as part of the "Loan Dis-
bursed to Date" figure of $77 ,565.00 on line 1. Both parties agreed 
to reduce the price shown on line 53 of the first page of the Earnest 
Money Contract by $27,000, from $136,000 to $109,000, mistakenly be-
lieving that by so altering the Earnest Money Contract they were 
accurately setting forth their intention to show only the cost of the 
home on the contract. In fact, the $18,000 payment advanced by the 
bank from the construction loan to pay off the prior mortgage had 
not been included by the Defendant's bookkeeper, Mrs. Squires, when 
she prepared the cost breakdown sheet. In order to accurately reflect 
the intention and understanding of the parties, the $136,000 purchase 
price initially shown on the Earnest Money Contract should have been 
reduced by only $9 ,000 (the "lot payoff" figure on line 37 of the 
cost estimate sheet) to $127,000, rather than reduced by the full 
$27,000 to $109,000. 
Having correctly determined that because of mutual mistake, the 
Earnest Money Contract did not reflect the parties intention, the 
trial court should have entered judgment reforming the price term 
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of the contract and ordering it to be increased from $109,000 to $127,000. 
Since the trial court did not, it behooves this august body to apply the 
legal principles of reformation enunciated by this court in the foregoing 
cited cases and require the trial court to so act. 
As a final observation it should be noted that in cases involving 
mutual mistake courts have on occasion awarded relief in the form of re-
cision, rather than reformation, of the written instrument. See: 
Ross v. Harding, 64 Wash.2d 231, 391 P.2d 526 (1964), Elsinore Union 
Elementary School District v. Kastorff, Cal. , 353 P.2d 713 
(1960) . The Defendant Kay Peterson Construction urges this court to 
consider that such a remedy would be entirely inappropriate here. Neither 
party has ever requested recision of the Earnest Money Contract. More-
over, the Mabeys have lived in the home which is the subject of the 
contract since its completion in the spring of 1980 and have (presumably) 
made payments during that period on the loans they obtained to purchase 
the home. To attempt at this time to undo the transaction rather than 
reform it, would be to create additional, involved and unnecessary problems 
concerning property valuation, payments made, reasonable rental value, 
etc. The Defendant Kay Peterson Construction requested reformation in its 
counterclaim and in its case as presented at trial. The Mabeys claimed 
only damages. Recision would only exacerbate the difficulties created 
by the parties' mistake, not resolve them. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND DEFENDANT KAY PETERSON 
CONSTRUCTION'S COMPLAINT AND IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN 
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FAVOR OF DEFENDANT KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION ACCORDING TO THE 
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL. 
Once the trial court had properly concluded that there was a 
mutual mistake of fact in the formation of the price term of the 
Earnest Money Contract and the clear and undisputed evidence established 
that the amount of the mistake was $18,000, the trial court was com-
pelled under Rules 15(b) and 54(c) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to consider the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's counter-
claim amended, to conform it to the evidence presented and to enter 
judgment accordingly on behalf of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construe-
tion in the sum of $18,000. The first part of Rule lS(b) provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
by the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
dence and to raise these issues may be made upon mo-
tion of any party at any time, even after the judgment; 
but failure to so amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 54(c) (1) provides in pertinent part: 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In interpreting these rules, this court has continually emphasized 
that the judgment of the trial court should reflect proper applica-
tion of the law to the evidence and findings actually determined at 
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tr.ial, regardless of the pleadings of the parties and the claims or 
defenses which may or may not have been expressed therein. In First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah, 
1979) this court reviewed the application of both Rule 15(b) and Rule 
54(c) (1) and observed: 
Whatever else may be said about whether it is mandatory or 
discretionary under the rules just quoted to grant such a 
motion to amend, it could not be made plainer that the 
underlying purpose of the rules is that judgment shOUld be 
granted in accordance with the law and the evidence as the 
ends of justice require; and that this is true whether the 
pleadings are actually amended or not. 
Id at 861 (Emphasis added.) 
In its examination of Rule 15(b), this court in General Insurance 
Company of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d 502 (Utah, 
1976) stated: 
The purpose of an amendment to conform to proof is to bring 
the pleadings in line with the actual issues upon which the 
case was tried. There must, of course, be either express 
or implied consent of the parties for the trial of issues 
not raised in the pleadings. Implied consent may be found 
where one party raises an issue material to the other party's 
case; or where evidence is introduced without objection. 
Significantly, the first part of Rule 15(b) is not permissive 
in terms, for it provides that issues tried by express or im-
plied consent shall be treated as if raised in the pleadings. 
Even failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial 
of these issues 
Id at 506 (Emphasis added.) 
See also: Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973); 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969); 
Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752 (Utah, 1978). 
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At the trial of the case at bar no objection was raised by the 
Plaintiffs Mabey to the testimony of Kay Peterson, the president of 
the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction, concerning the innocent and 
inadvertent omission of the $18,000 bank advance from the cost esti-
mate attached to the Earnest Money Contract nor concering the mistaken 
belief of the parties that the $18,000 payment was included in the cost 
estimate. In fact, Tom Mabey testified that he also believed the 
$18,000 advance to be included in the figures shown on the cost 
estimate sheet. The only objection made by the Mabeys was in con-
nection with the business records of Kay Peterson Construction which 
were introduced to establish that the $77,565.00 amount shown as 
"Loan Disbursed to Date" on line 1 of the cost estimate sheet in fact 
represented advances only for materials and labor and not the $18,000 
lot payment, and the objection was made on the grounds of lack of 
foundation (T-120,121). This objection was overruled by the court 
(T-121) . No objection to this evidence was made on the grounds that 
it was irrelevent or beyond or outside the scope of the pleadings. 
It is clear from Rule 15{b) as explained in Carnicero, supra, and 
from Rule 54(c) (1) as noted in Colonial Ford, supra, that the court 
below was compelled at the close of trial to grant judgment to the 
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction "in accordance with the law and 
the evidence" Colonial Ford, supra at 861. The trial court was re-
quired upon a finding of mutual mistake to enter judgment reforming the 
price term of the Earnest Money Contract upwards by $18,000 from 
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$109,000 to $127,000, and to award judgment to Kay Peterson Construction 
for $18,000. 
Notwithstanding the clear requirements of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the law, the trial court awarded the Defendant Kay Peterson 
Construction only the sum of $11,037.46, which was the exact same amount 
originally requested in the counterclaim initially filed on behalf of 
Kay Peterson Cosntruction against the Plaintiffs Mabey. This court must 
remedy the lower court's error and require entry of a judgment reforming 
the Earnest Money Contract and awarding Kay Peterson Construction the 
sum of $18,000.00. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PLAINTIFFS MABEY 
FOR INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED. 
At the conclusion of trial, having correctly determined there was a 
mutual mistake of fact in the formation of the Earnest Money Contract, the 
court then proceeded to render judgment both to the Defendant Kay Peterson 
Construction and to the Plaintiffs Mabey (T-132,133). The errors in 
those aspects of the judgment for the Defendent Kay Peterson Construction 
have been discussed previously in this brief. 
With respect to the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs Mabey (and 
excepting for the moment the award for the cost of repairs, which is 
considered infra) , the court allowed judgment for (a) the payments made 
by Plaintiffs Mabey to satisfy the oustanding liens on the home, (b) the 
interest accrued at 18% on the money borrowed by Mabeys to pay the liens 
and (c) attorney's fees in the sum of $2,500.00. The court did not offer 
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an explanation of its basis or reasoning for any of the awards to 
the Mabeys, other than to remark that the interest incurred by the 
Mabeys on the money borrowed to pay the liens was "a valid claim" 
(T-132). While the award for moneys expended by the Mabeys to 
satisfy outstanding liens could reasonably be considered a set-off 
against the judgment that should have been entered in favor of Kay 
Peterson Construction in reforming the Earnest Money Contract, in 
view of the court's finding of mutual mistake, the additional awards 
to the Mabeys are erroneous and must be reversed. 
The key to a legally consistent judgment involves the clear 
recognition that the parties' respective positions relative to the 
Earnest Money Contract are not merely conflicting, but rather that 
they are mutually exclusive. The trial court's decision turned 
upon the interpretation of the facts and circumstances surroundi~g 
the formation and execution of the contract. The evidence presented 
required the court to resolve the question of whether the Earnest 
Money Contract provided for a $109,000.00 fixed price or whether, 
due to mutual mistake, the·price term should be reformed to $127,000.00. 
Most assuredly, one cannot have it both ways. Plaintiffs Mabeys' 
claims for damages were entirely premised upon the former contention, 
whereas Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's position was based 
upon the latter assertion. That is to say, Mabeys' claims for breach 
of contract and for damages in the form of reimbursement of the 
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amounts paid in excess of the contract price to satisfy lien claimants 
are valid only if the amounts they paid were actually in excess of the 
contract price. If they were not, then the Mabeys merely paid for the 
improvements which they selected and received, there was no contract 
breach by Kay Peterson Construction and Mabeys have no basis for com-
plaint against the Construction Company. Conversely, Defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction's position is that there was an innocent mutual 
mistake in determining the price term. Consequently, the Earnest Money 
Contract should be reformed to adjust the purchase price upward by 
$18,000.00. As so reformed, the contract price is in excess of the 
amounts paid by the Mabeys for the house, regardless of whether those 
payments were made directly to Kay Peterson Construction or to third 
party lien claimants. There can be, therefore, no breach of the Earnest 
Money Contract by Kay Peterson Construction. 
This conclusion is not merely an academic point; it has practical 
consequences. They are: 
(1) If the Earnest Money Contract was not breached, then there 
is no basis for an award of interest upon the amounts borrowed by the 
Mabeys to pay the lien claimants, as the same would be, at best, con-
sequential damages for a breach of contract. 
(2) If the Earnest Money Contract was not breached, then there is 
no basis for an award of attorney's fees to the Mabeys, as the same must 
be either predicated on a breach of the contract (Pl.Ex.3, lines 47 and 48) 
or found to be consequential damages incurred in satisfying lien claimants. 
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The undisputed evidence clearly supports the position that upon 
reformation of the Earnest Money Contract to reflect the understanding 
of the parties, there was no breach thereof by the Defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction. Adjusting the price term of the contract up-
wards by $18,000 from $109,000 to $127,000, and considering the 
amounts paid by the Mabeys to satisfy the liens gives the following: 
Erroneous Contract Price 
Mistaken Exclusion from Price 
Reformed Contract Price 
Amounts Paid by Mabeys 
Paid to Kay Peterson 
Construction 
Paid to Lien Claimants 
Total Paid 
($109,000.00) 
( 9,737.00) 
Net Balance Due Under Contract 
$109,000.00 
18,000.00 
127,000.00 
(118,737.00) 
$ 8,263.00 
Not only are there no damages accruing to Mabeys under the re-
formed contract for payments in excess of the contract price, there 
is an unpaid balance owing to Kay Peterson Construction. The reason 
that the lien claimants were not paid is obvious. The Mabeys re-
ceived a mistaken windfall and ended up paying Kay Peterson Construe-
tion $18 ,000 less than they should have. Had Kay Peterson Construc.tion 
received the correct amount, the materialmen and the sub-contractors 
who filed liens would have been easily satisfied. The fact that the 
Mabeys paid the lien claimants directly, rather than through the 
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction is not in itself a ground for 
any complaint. The question is whether the Mabeys paid more than 
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the contract price. The answer is that, in view of the mutual mistake, 
they did not. Indeed, they got something of a bargain. 
Obviously in cases of mutual mistake there are two innocent parties. 
Therefore, in determining who should bear the burden of the mistake, it 
is appropriate to consider who obtained the benefits thereof. The Mabeys 
obtained and now enjoy the benefits of the labor and materials represented 
by the lien claims they paid. The cabinets, carpeting and other items 
are in their home and are used by them daily. It is hardly unfair that 
they should be required to pay for them, and that is all they have done 
by satisfying the lien claimants. They may be disappointed by discovery 
of the mistake, but they have not been injured. Conversely, shifting 
the burden to the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction merely adds insult 
to injury. Kay Peterson Construction received no benefit from the 
goods and services represented by the lien claims. But for the Mabeys' 
the money they paid is the same. Had they not paid it to the lien 
claimants, they would owe it to Kay Peterson Construction under the 
reformed contract and Kay Peterson Construction would owe the lien 
claimants. So it is ultimately inconsistent to reform the price term 
of the Earnest Money Contract and then award damages on the basis of the 
original contract price, as the trial court apparently attempted to do. 
Once again, one cannot have it both ways. 
In summary, this is not a case of off-setting errors, although it 
may superficially appear to be so at first glance. By reforming the 
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Earnest Money Contract as must be done under these circumstances, 
to remedy the parties' mutual mistake, the Mabeys' claim for breach 
of contract must be extinguished. That is to say, the Mabeys have 
not been required to pay more than the reformed contract price. If 
there is no breach of the reformed contract terms, then there is no 
basis for an award of attorney's fees to Mabeys, whether as conse-
quential damages for settlement of lien claims or as direct compensa-
tion for services rendered in this action, and claims for interest 
on the amounts ostensibly borrowed by the Mabeys to pay for the liens 
must also be dismissed. As there was no contract breach, there can 
be no damages, much less consequential damages, attendant thereon, 
and this court should so hold. 
POINT II: 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO CARRY THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF 
WITH RESPECT TO DAMAGES RESULTING FROM 
CLAIMED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP, AND THE COURT ERRED 
IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFFS ON THOSE CLAIMS. 
It is axiomatic in the law that before a party may be awarded 
a judgment for damages, sufficiently detailed and adequate evidence as 
to the existence and the amount of damages and the manner of their 
computation must be presented to the court. 22Arn. Jur. 2d Damages §22. 
Failing the submission of proof which is of a nature that would allow 
reasonable ascertainment of the basis for and amount of damages, the 
court must deny an award of any more than nominal damages to the 
complaining party. Doyle v. McBee, 161 Colo. 130, 420 P.2d 247 (1966), 
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B & B Farms, Inc. v. Matlock's Fruit Farms, Inc., 73 Wash.2d 146, 437 
P.2d 178 (1968). It should be observed that this rule requires reasonable 
certainty in two separate and distinct factual areas: first, it must be 
reasonably certain that damages exist, i.e., the plaintiff must establish 
by sufficient evidence that he has been damaged and that there is a 
factual basis on which to award damages; and second, the amount of the 
damages which the plaintiff has suffered must be susceptible to reason-
able ascertainment. Plaintiffs Mabey failed at trial to meet adequately 
this standard of certainty in either area. 
Turning first to an examination of that part of the rule which 
concerns reasonable certainty in determining amount of damage, the Utah 
Supreme Court has regularly adhered to and espoused the above-noted 
"damage certainty rule" when determining whether the amount of a damage 
award has been proper. In Johnson v. Hughes, 120 Utah 50, 232 P.2d 362 
(1951) , this court reviewed a lower court decision granting damages to 
the plaintiff homeowners and against the defendant contractor resulting 
from sub-standard workmanship in the construction of two homes. In 
examining the trial court record and for the most part sustaining the 
judgment entered, the Supreme Court noted that damage amounts had been 
individually itemized. In other words, the total judgment entered was 
based on the amounts separately determined by the trial court as neces-
sary to repair each of the alleged defects. Id, 232 P.2d at 364. Never-
theless, this court reversed and remanded with respect to those elements 
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of damage which had not been segregated, observing that an award of 
damages required greater certainty than that provided by the unsegre-
gated evidence. Id at 366. 
In Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962), a case 
involving an alleged breach of a land sale contract, this court noted 
that the measure of damages in a contract breach action is the market 
value of the property at the time of the breach less the contract price 
to the vendee. In applying this rule the court referred to the need 
for reasonable certainty in damage amount determinations: 
• . . to recover damages plaintiff must prove not only that 
she has suffered a loss, but must also prove the extent and 
amount thereof. Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based on 
the value of the property there must be proof of its value 
or evidence of such facts as will warrant a finding of value 
with reasonable certainty. 
368 P.d. at 601 (Emphasis added.) 
The rule of certainty in damage awards is conunon in other juris-
dictions as well. In Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc. v. Town 
of Las Vegas, 75 N.M. 426, 405 P.2d 646 (1965) the New Mexico Supreme 
Court reviewed a lower court damage award against a contractor based 
upon a claim for breach of contract resulting from defects that appeared 
in the construction of a sewage facility. The court stated that: 
If the defect is remediable from a practical standpoint, 
recovery generally will be based on the market price of 
completing or correcting the performance, and this will 
generally be shown by the cost of getting work done or 
completed by another person. 
405 P.2d at 668 (Court's emphasis.) 
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Noting that damages must be of the kind and character susceptible 
to proof and the amount allowed must be subject to reasonable ascertain-
ment, the court reversed the trial court's damage award of $19,043.00 
and remanded, pointing out that the only evidence as to the damage amount 
adduced at trial was the testimony of T. E. Scanlon, an engineer, who 
in response to counsel's inquiry stated that his estimate of cost to 
repair the defects "was roughly twenty thousand dollars," Id at 667. 
The court refused to allow an award based on evidence which it character-
ized as no more than a "rough estimate." 
Turning to the record in the case at bar, the sole evidence pre-
sented to establish the amount of damages for the alleged defects in 
construction consisted of the following exchange between the Plaintiff 
Tom Mabey and his own counsel, Mr. Diumenti, concerning the cost of 
reparing the alleged defects: 
Q Do you have an idea of the cost of the materials, 
whether it be mortar, nails, the electrical wiring, and the 
amount of time necessary to effect those repairs? 
A Yes I do. 
Q And what is your estimate? 
A I have estimated about $5,400.00. 
Q And that is based on what hourly charge? 
A Well it's based about on an average of 14 to 20 
dollars, about $17.00 an hour. 
Q Have you in estimating that, did you take into account 
the economy of time, for instance, that while perfa-tape and 
plaster is drying, somebody could be fixing an electrical doorbell? 
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A Yes I did. 
[T-34,35 (Emphasis added.)] 
No other evidence of any kind was presented to the court or exists 
in the record to testablish the amount of the da.-rna.ges claimed. The 
testimony of Mr. Mabey that repair costs are "about $5,400.00" based 
upon an average hourly wage of "about $17.00 an hour" clearly does not 
meet the standard of this court and other courts, which standard re-
quires proof or evidence as will warrant a finding of a damage amount 
"with reasonable certainty." Bunnell v. Bills, supra, Lyster, General 
Contractor, Inc. v. Town of Las Vegas, supra. 
As a further indication of the suspect and uncertain nature of 
the testimony presented concerning the amount of claimed damages, it 
should be noted that in Plaintiffs Mabeys' original complaint the 
amount requested as damages for the alleged faulty construction was 
$5,440.00 (R-2). By the time of trial the number of alleged defects in 
construction claimed by the Mabeys had been pared down from seventeen 
itemized in a letter from Tom Mabey to his legal counsel (Pl.Ex.H) to 
only ten shown on the Correction Report from the State Board of 
Contractors (Pl.Ex.I). Notwithstanding the fact that the number of 
defects claimed by the Mabeys had been reduced at trial by more than 
40%, Mr. Mabey's estimate of repair .costs ($5,400.00) for the items 
shown on the Correction Report (see T-34) exceeded 99% of and was 
only $40 less than the amount originally claimed in the complaint, 
which, one must assume, was based on the original list of claimed 
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defects in Mr. Mabey's letter! Considering the substantial reduction 
in the number of defects alleged from the time the complaint was filed 
until the time of trial, the amazing similarity between the amount claimed 
by Plaintiffs Mabey in their complaint and the amount expressed by Tom 
Mabey while on the witness stand would lead one to conclude that in 
testifying, either Mr. Mabey erroneously based his estimate for repairs 
on the original list of alleged defects or else he simply increased his 
estimate of repair cost for the remaining alleged defects as the length 
of the list was reduced. Regardless of the reasons or basis for Mr. 
Mabey's testimony, when it is viewed and tested with the closeness re-
quired by the rules of law adhered to by this court, it must be found 
inadequate to support the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. 
Turning to that aspect of the certainty of damage rule which re-
quires a party to show by sufficient and competent evidence that a 
basis for an award of damages exists, a review of the trial transcript 
and documentary evidence presented clearly demonstrates that here also, 
the Mabeys failed to carry their burden. At trial the Mabeys presented 
two written documents containing lists of alleged defects in construc-
tion. The first, a letter from Tom Mabey to Mr. Diumenti, his attorney, 
(Pl.Ex.H) listed seventeen complaints concerning the construction of 
the home. The second, a legal-sized document styled "Correction Report" 
(Pl.Ex.I} listed ten separate items. These exhibits were admitted, but 
due to objection from Defendant's counsel, they were admitted solely 
for informational purposes, and not to establish the truthfulness of 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the allegations contained in the documents. In other words, the trial 
court ruled in receiving the exhibits that they were not evidence the 
alleged defects actually existed or that the Defendant Kay Peterson 
Construction was responsible or liable for their repair. Therefore, 
in order for the trial court to have properly awarded damages to the 
Mabeys based upon defective workmanship, the evidence thereof must 
have come from other documents or testimony. 
The only other evidence presented to the court concerning the 
alleged defects in construction was the testimony of Tom Mabey, who 
vaguely stated that there were "inadequacies" and "deficiencies," 
which he wrote down on Plaintiff's Exhibit H, the excluded document 
(T-29,30). He also testified that agents from the State Department 
of Contractors had inspected the home and made a list of what they 
felt were "deficiencies" (T-31), which list was the excluded Plain-
tiff's Exhibit I. 
No evidence of any kind was presented to show the cause of the 
alleged defects or to connect or link them to the Defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction. For example, there was no evidence presented 
to show whether the alleged roof leak was due to poor workmanship or 
whether it resulted from improper design of the roof. Remember it 
was Tom Mabey who obtained, substantially modified and delivered the 
construction plans to Kay Peterson Construction (T-41). Mr. Mabey 
admitted on cross-examination that some of the so-called "deficiencies" 
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shown on the "Correction Report" (PLEx.I) were items left out of the 
construction of the home because their inclusion would have violated 
state building codes (T-68,69). 
What is clear from a close review of the trial transcript is that 
the trial court, relying on the representations of Plaintiffs' counsel 
in chambers before trial, believed the "Correction Report" {Pl.ExeI) to 
be a prior adjudication by the State Board of Contractors of the lia-
bility of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction for repair of the 
items listed on the report, notwithstanding the representations of 
Defendant's counsel in chambers that neither he nor his client were 
aware of any such order or judgment. Moreover, the lower court limited 
the scope of examination and sustained objections to testimony and evi-
dence, apparently in reliance on that belief. 
Reference to the court's comments in this connection is instruc-
tive. For example, when Mr. Ditunenti asked Mr. Mabey during his examina-
tion if there were additional defects in the home which were not in-
eluded in the Correction Report, the trial judge interrupted, stating: 
Now Mr. Ditunenti if I understand your question, I think 
the ground rules I laid in there was [sic] that anything other 
than those that the Department said were deficient we would 
not consider. 
(T-31, lines 27-30) (Emphasis added.) 
The exchange between the court and counsel at T-66 and T-67 again 
reveals the thinking of the trial judge: 
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THE COURT: I just limited Mr. Jensen from even 
talking about anything in addition to that because if 
this man comes in and says all these additional defects 
are in this house, the State man has gone out and in-
spected and found only these defects in this house, I 
said to Mr. Diumenti that you are not going to be able 
to talk about all these things that you imagine are real 
because the State didn't find it. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to the trial court's belief, the Correction Report was 
not an adjudication of defects or contractor liability. It was 
nothing more than a form of complaint, used to initiate administra-
tive proceedings before the State Board of Contractors. Affidavit of 
Steven Schwendiman (R204-206) . 
In summary, a careful review of the trial transcript shows that 
the Mabeys' claims of defective workmanship were based on vague 
assertions, inaccurate characterization of documents and little else. 
The certainty which must be present to sustain an award for damages 
is clearly absent from the record. The trial court's judgment must 
be reversed. 
POINT III: 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS ON DAMAGES INCURRED BY DEFENDANT 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION RESULTING FROM THE MUTUAL MISTAKE 
OF THE PARTIES AND DAMAGES INCURRED BY PLAINTIFFS MABEY 
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP 
ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The standard for review of findings of fact in equity cases has 
been enunciated by this court in countless appellate decisions, which 
for the sake of brevity are not collected and cited here. Rather, 
a typical, but comprehensive explanation of that standard is excerpted: 
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due to the advantaged position of the trial court we will 
review its findings and judgments with considerable indulgence, 
and will not disagree with and upset them unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against them, or the court has mistaken 
or misapplied the law applicable thereto. 
Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452,454 (Utah, 1975) 
From the foregoing it is clear that this court will not overturn 
lower court findings in equity cases which are supported by some evidence 
and are in harmony with the law. 
The trial court's findings relative to the equitable holding that 
the Earnest Money Contract was formulated and executed under a mutual 
mistake of fact are as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 17: That defendant Kay Peterson 
Construction Company erred in the preparation of Exhibit A 
upon which Exhibit the parties negotiated the purchase price 
of the residence in the sum of $11,037.47 to its detriment. 
Said error arose out of defendant Kay Peterson Construction 
Company's omission from consideration a transaction concerning 
the subject lot in November 1979. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 18: That prior to the 25th day of 
March 1980, plaintiffs and defendant Kay Peterson Construction 
Company reviewed and discussed Exhibit A and neither was aware 
of the defendant's mistake. From which mistake defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction Company suffered a loss in his contempla-
tion of $11,037.37 [sic]. 
The difficulty with these findings is obvious on their face: They 
fail to consider at all the clear and undisputed evidence presented at 
trial that it was the Earnest Money Contract in setting forth the purchase 
price of the home only, that was executed under a mutual mistake of fact 
(see Point I.A., supra). Moreover, the findings recite that the amount 
of damages resulting from the mistake was $11,037.47, an amount which 
-34-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nowhere appears in the trial proceedings. (That number is the damage 
amount requested in Defendant Kay Peterson Construction's original 
counterclaim [R-16].) The only evidence presented to the lower court 
concerning the amount of the mistake (and hence, the amount of damages) 
clearly establishes that figure as $18,000.00 (see Point I.B.,supra). 
As noted above the standard for review on appeal requires only some 
evidence to support findings. In this instance there is no evidence 
whatsoever. The findings must be rejected by this court as inadequate 
and incorrect. 
As with the standard for review in equity cases, this court's 
procedures for reviewing findings in actions at law have also been 
stated many times. Again, turning to just one such statement we read: 
. • . on review we survey the evidence in the light favor-
able to the findings, which ever party they may favor; .•. 
they will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported 
by substantial evidence." 
Bramel v. Utah State Road Conunission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 52, 
465 P.2d 534 (1970) 
While as in equity matters, this court attempts in actions at 
law to view favorably the trial court's findings, the applicable 
review standard is slightly higher. The findings in an action at 
law must be "supported by substantial evidence." Turning to the 
lower court's findings in this action dealing with the recovery 
at law by the Plaintiffs Mabey for damages resulting from faulty 
workmanship, we note: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 11: Defendant Peterson Construction Company 
[si.c] failed to complete the construction of the residence located 
on the subject real property in a quality workmanlike fashion as 
contemplated by the parties in respect to the following inadequacies: 
See attached Exhibit A. 
FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 12: As a result of defendant Kay 
Peterson Construction Company's failure to complete the improve-
ments in a quality workmanlike fashion as contemplated by the 
parties, plaintiffs Mabey will be required to expend the sum of 
$5,400.00 to remedy the inadequacies. 
As has been explained and argued at some length in Point II of this 
brief, the evidence presented by the Mabeys in support of their damage 
claims falls considerably short of the standards necessary for proof 
thereof. Defendant Kay Peterson Construction submits that the same 
difficulty afflicts the above findings. The evidence presented (what 
little there was) can hardly be found to meet a standard for review which 
requires "substantial evidence." The findings must be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
At the close of trial, the lower court properly and correctly found 
that there had been a mutual mistake in the formation of the Earnest 
Money Contract entered into by the parties for the sale of the home. 
Error arose, however, when the trial court failed to properly apply the 
law to its findings. This court must now rectify that error and require 
(1) reformation of the Earnest Money Contract to reflect the parties' 
intention and understanding, (2) entry of a judgment in favor of the 
Defendant Kay Peterson Construction which conforms to the evidence and 
(3) reversal of the judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiffs Mabey 
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for consequential interest and attorney's fees. 
The judgment of the trial court for damages resulting from alleged 
defects in construction does not find adequate support in the evidence 
presented at trial, because the standard of certainty required for 
damage awards was not met by the Plaintiffs Mabey. This court must 
reverse the judgment of the trial court. 
The trial court's findings concerning the mutual mistake of the 
parties and the damages resulting from alleged construction defects 
do not meet the standards for review expressed by this court and must 
be rejected. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June, 1982. 
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